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Abstract
We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the
introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model
for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities
sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal's (1998) results are
robust against managerial delegation.
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This paper presents a theoretical analysis of mixed duopoly where a public ﬁrm and a private
ﬁrm choose whether to set their own quantities sequentially or simultaneously. The literature
on mixed oligopoly mainly assumes that the order of ﬁrms’ moves is exogenous. Since an
alternative order of moves gives rise to diﬀerent results in mixed oligopoly, it is signiﬁcantly
important to endogenously examine the timing at which they choose their quantities/prices. The
issue of the endogenous order in mixed oligopoly has been analyzed by Pal (1998), Matsumura
(2003), Lu (2006), and Barcena-Ruiz (2007). In his pioneering work, Pal (1998) considered
the situation in which ﬁrms decide quantities. Matsumura (2003) and Lu (2006) extended the
analysis to investigate the competition between a domestic public ﬁrm and foreign private ﬁrms,
and Barcena-Ruiz (2007) followed them by considering the model of price competition. All
of the above works adopt the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in their
analysis. This paper also focuses on the role of the endogenous timing of ﬁrms’ moves using the
observable delay game along the lines of these works.
In the four above mentioned papers of Pal (1998), Matsumura (2003), Lu (2006), and
Barcena-Ruiz (2007), the public ﬁrm and private ﬁrms are all assumed to be an entrepreneurial
ones, that is, each managerial decision-making process is enforced by the owner of each ﬁrm.
The literature on mixed oligopoly has paid scant attention to investigating the management of
ﬁrms, whereas there have been numerous contributions on the managerial incentive contract in
private oligopoly since the pioneering works of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987).
The papers by Barros (1995), White (2001), and Nishimori and Ogawa (2005) are notable ex-
ceptions. Separating the ownership and management within both of public and private ﬁrms,
in each paper, Barros and White modeled the incentive contracts that are linear in terms of
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and sales revenue ` a la Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), so-called
FJS contract. Nishimori and Ogawa considered the interaction between the length of incentive
contracts and market behavior using a two-period mixed oligopolistic framework. However, the
literature has not considered the issue of what type of competition occurs in the equilibrium in
the case of introducing managerial delegation within both a public and private ﬁrm, when they
can endogenously choose their moves.
The purpose of this paper is primarily to examine whether Pal’s (1998) results are robust
when managerial delegation is introduced in a mixed duopolistic model for diﬀerentiated goods.
In the literature on private duopoly, Lambertini (2000) adopted the same approach as ours. In
this paper, we extend the scope of the model through the application of Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990) in the context of mixed oligopoly, by introducing the FJS contract as in Lambertini
(2000). In contrast to the case of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, each ﬁrm’s owner delegates the output
decision to a manager. Each manager sets the output to maximize his/her payoﬀ deﬁned by an
incentive contract provided by the ﬁrm’s owner. Our interest lies in which order of moves will
lead to an equilibrium in the case of introducing managerial delegation. The results obtained
in this paper are similar to those in Pal (1998). We ﬁnd that a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm
choose quantities sequentially in our delegation model. Thus, in the context of a quantity setting
mixed duopoly where a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm are domestic, we ﬁnd that the results in
the observable delay game are robust against the FJS contract.
1The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the basic setting of
the model. In Section 3, we analyze three types of competition of ﬁxed timing and present the
equilibrium in our model. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Model
We consider a mixed duopolistic model using a standard product diﬀerentiation model as in
Singh and Vives (1984). The model consists of a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm, both of which
produce a diﬀerentiated good. In the rest of this paper, we often refer to the public (private)
ﬁrm as Firm 0 (Firm 1) and the owner of the public (private) ﬁrm as Owner 0 (Owner 1). A
representative consumer’s utility is denoted as1




0 + 2bq0q1 + q2
1), b 2 [0,1),
where qi is the quantity of good i (= 0,1), and b represents the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Then, the inverse demand functions are given by
pi = a ¡ qi ¡ bqi, b 2 [0,1), i,j = 0,1, i 6= j,
where pi is the price of good i (= 0,1). We assume that both the two ﬁrms have constant
marginal costs of production. However, it is assumed that Firm 0 is less eﬃcient than Firm 1,
and thus, the Firm 0’s marginal cost is c > 0, whereas Firm 1’s marginal cost is normalized to
0. The proﬁts of the Firms 0 and 1 are given by
Π0 = (a ¡ q0 ¡ bq1 ¡ c)q0 and Π1 = (a ¡ q1 ¡ bq0)q1, respectively.
As usual, social welfare, denoted by W, is measured as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and
producer surplus (PS):
W = CS + PS.
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1).
We assume that Owner 0 is a welfare maximizer, whereas Owner 1 maximizes his/her own ﬁrm’s
proﬁt.
To formalize managerial delegation, we mainly follow Lambertini (2000). The owners can
assess the performance of their managers according to two observable indicators, the output and
proﬁt of the ﬁrm. In this case, Firm i considers the following indicator:
Vi = Πi + θiqi, θi 2 R, i = 0,1,
where parameter θi identiﬁes the weight attached to the value of sales (delegation parameter).
The manager of Firm i can maximize his/her payoﬀ by choosing the output qi that maximizes Vi.
This can be supported by the assumption that the payoﬀ to the manager of Firm i is represented
1We assume that b < 1 to assure that the function U(q0,q1) is strictly concave, however, the following results
hold even though each of the two ﬁrms produces a single homogeneous good, that is b = 1.
2as λi+µiVi for some real number λi and some positive number µi. Similar to Lambertini (2000)
and White (2001), we assume that the payoﬀs to the managers are negligible as compared to
proﬁts, because we emphasize the impact of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes.
We propose the following three-stage game as an application of the observable delay game
of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Note that the third stage consists of two periods; let the ﬁrst
(second) period denote period 1 (period 2). In the ﬁrst stage, Owner i (i = 0,1) independently
chooses ti 2 ffirst, secondg, where ti indicates the time of which should be set output qi.
ti = first implies that Firm i’s manager sets his/her own output in period 1 of the third stage,
and ti = second implies that he/she sets his/her own output in period 2 of the third stage.
In the second stage, each of Owners 0 and 1 simultaneously sets their respective ﬁrm’s level of
θi. In the third stage, each of the ﬁrm’s managers selects the output in the period that the
corresponding Owners 0 and 1 choose in the ﬁrst stage. If both the owners choose the same
period, the managers take decisions simultaneously. If Owner i chooses ti = first and the other
j (6= i) chooses tj = second, the quantity competition is sequential. We adopt a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, and thus the game is solved backward.
3 Result
In the third stage, the manager of each ﬁrm chooses its output qi to maximize Vi (i = 0,1).
There are three subgames in this stage: the simultaneous game (Case S), the sequential game
with Firm 0 as the leader (Case L), and the sequential game with Firm 0 as the follower (Case
F). Thus, we analyze the equilibrium for each case. The equilibrium points are showed in Figure
1. In this ﬁgure, point k 2 fS,L,Fg is the equilibrium point in Case k and Ri(qj) represents
the reaction function of Firm i (i,j = 0,1; j 6= i),
R0(q1) =
a ¡ c ¡ bq1 + θ0
2
, R1(q0) =
a ¡ bq0 + θ1
2
. (1)
























Figure 1: Equilibrium points in the third stage
In the second stage, the owner of each ﬁrm chooses θi to maximize their respective objective
3functions. Owner 0 maximizes social welfare, while Owner 1 maximizes the proﬁt of Firm 1.
Consequently, we obtain the equilibrium values of the delegation parameter θk
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16−20b2+5b4 in Case L,
θF
1 = 0 in Case F.
In the above three cases, the delegation parameter of Owner 0 can take a positive or negative
value, whereas the parameter of Owner 1 does not take a negative value. This is because the
characteristics of the delegation is similar to the ability to move ﬁrst for Owner 1, as mentioned by
Lambertini (2000). Thus, the owner chooses θ
j
1 ¸ 0 to expand the output of Firm 1. In addition,
when Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader in the third stage (Case F), the owner chooses θF
1 = 0
because there is no need for expanding the output. However, for Owner 0, the delegation has a
diﬀerent meaning. The owner wishes to convert the objective of the manager into social welfare
maximization, and thus, chooses the delegation parameter to move the equilibrium point in the
third stage to the ﬁrst best social welfare. For example, in the simultaneous game, since R0(q1)
shifts outward with the increase in θ0 as described in (1), Owner 0 sets a positive parameter if
the iso-welfare curve touches R1(q0) in the right of the equilibrium point S; otherwise, it sets
a negative parameter. This mechanism is analogous to partial privatization (c.f., Matsumura,
1998). Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism. RW(q0) denotes the reaction function of Firm 0 when
its manager maximizes social welfare, W represents an iso-welfare curve, and ES is the point at









































































Figure 2: The choice of θ0 in the simultaneous game
4In the other two sequential games, the mechanisms are analogous to the simultaneous game.
Thus, the delegation parameter of Owner 0 can take a positive or negative value.
The equilibrium payoﬀs of both the owners in the second stage are as follows.
Owner 0:
8
> > > > > > > <












2(16−20b2+5b4)2 in Case L,
WF =
a2(28−24b−12b2+8b3+b4)−2ac(16−12b−8b2+4b3+b4)+c2(16−8b2+b4)
2(16−20b2+5b4) in Case F,
Owner 1:
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(16−20b2+5b4)2 in Case F.
These payoﬀs can be ordered according to the following ranking:





Meanwhile, if the owners directly manage their respective ﬁrms (in other words, V0 and V1
are replaced by W and Π1, respectively), the payoﬀ ranking of the three cases is as follows (Pal,
1998).






1 > b ΠL
1 > b ΠS





1 > b ΠF
1 > b ΠS
1 otherwise,
where the hat (b) represents the case in which there is no delegation and the ﬁrms are managed
by their owners. The ranking of Owner 0 changes with the introduction of the delegation. In this
no-delegation case, Owner 0 desires to move late in order to reduce his/her own ﬁrm’s output
without greatly reducing total output and to cut down the total cost. However, in the above
delegation case, Owner 0 wishes to move ﬁrst since he/she cannot control the ﬁrm’s output
completely. On the other hand, when the substitutability of the goods is suﬃciently large, the
ranking of Owner 1 also changes.
In the ﬁrst stage, both the owners choose the timing of setting their own outputs in the third
stage. This game can be described in the following matrix. Thus, by the payoﬀ rankings (2) and
(3), the equilibria in this stage are (t0,t1) = (first, second) and (second, first). Therefore,








1 ) (WS, ΠS
1)
Matrix 1: The choice of the timing
Proposition 1. There are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the three-stage game with
delegation. In one equilibrium, the timing of the two ﬁrms is (t0,t1) = (first, second) and the
delegation parameters, the quantities of both the ﬁrms (qk
i , i = 0,1; k = L,F), and the payoﬀs
of both the owners are as follows:
θL
0 =
a(32 ¡ 32b ¡ 24b2 + 28b3 + 2b4 ¡ 5b5) ¡ 2c(16 ¡ 12b2 + b4)
2(16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4)
, θL
1 =
4ab2(1 ¡ b) + 4b3c
16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ,
qL
0 =
a(16 ¡ 12b ¡ 8b2 + 5b3) ¡ 8c(2 ¡ b2)
16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4 , qL
1 =
2(2 ¡ b)(2 + b)(a ¡ ab + bc)






2(16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 ,
ΠL
1 =
4(2 ¡ b)(2 + b)(4 ¡ 3b2)(a ¡ ab + bc)2
(16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 .
In the other equilibrium, the timing is (t0,t1) = (second, first) and the respective values are
θF
0 =
a(16 ¡ 16b ¡ 4b2 + 6b3 ¡ b4) ¡ c(16 ¡ 4b2 ¡ b4)




a(16 ¡ 12b ¡ 8b2 + 4b3 + b4) ¡ c(4 ¡ b2)2
16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4 , qF
1 =
2(2 ¡ b)(2 + b)(a ¡ ab + bc)
16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ,
WF =
a2(28 ¡ 24b ¡ 12b2 + 8b3 + b4) ¡ 2ac(16 ¡ 12b ¡ 8b2 + 4b3 + b4) + c2(16 ¡ 8b2 + b4)




2(2 ¡ b)2(2 + b)2(2 ¡ b2)(a ¡ ab + bc)2
(16 ¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 .
These two subgame perfect Nash equilibria (first, second) and (second, first) are the same
in the no-delegation case (Pal, 1998). Therefore, Pal’s (1998) result is robust against the case
of delegation to managers when the managers are being delegated the output decision.
4 Conclusion
This paper examined a mixed duopolistic model using the observable delay game of Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990). We introduced managerial delegation ` a la Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Sklivas (1987) into the model of Pal (1998) and conﬁrmed the robustness of the results obtained
in Pal (1998) against such a extension. We showed that two managerial ﬁrms sequentially set
outputs in the equilibrium. Therefore, the use of simultaneous quantity choice models with
6managerial delegation as in Barros (1995) and White (2001) cannot be justiﬁed through the
endogenous timing game considered in this paper.
In this paper, as well as most existing works in this ﬁeld, we assume that a private ﬁrm
is domestic. The interesting extension of our model is to examine the case that a public ﬁrm
competes against a foreign private ﬁrm. In this case, the owner of the public ﬁrm takes consumer
surplus more seriously than the private ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Thus, the existence of the foreign private
ﬁrm may change the decision making of the owner of the public ﬁrm and, consequently, the
equilibrium outcomes as well. This is left for future research.
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